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In 1972, Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA).'
The purpose of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."2 How-
ever, states have questioned whether Congress intended to include
nonpoint source pollution, or pollution caused by water moving
over and through the ground that picks up various natural and hu-
man pollutants along the way, in the CWA's water quality stan-
dards and planning program.
This Comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals' treatment of the issue of nonpoint source regulation under
the CWA in Pronsolino v. Nastri. In Pronsolino, the court held
that the CWA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to establish total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for wa-
terways polluted solely by nonpoint sources of pollution.4 This
landmark ruling significantly furthers the EPA's efforts in restor-
ing and cleaning up the nation's waterways.5
Section II of this Comment describes the statutory back-
ground of the CWA, and Section III discusses the history and pro-
cedural posture of Pronsolino. Section IV describes the Pron-
solino's claims, the Ninth Circuit's analysis, and the Court's ulti-
mate holding. Finally, Section V focuses on the impact of the
Ninth Circuit's decision.
*Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky College of Law; B.A., summa cum laude, 2001,
Western Kentucky University.
'Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1994).
233 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
'291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
'Id.
'See Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Appeals Court Up-
holds Landmark Clean Water Decision, at http://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/r9press.nsf/7f3f954af9ece
39b882563fd0063a09c/812afe983bc2a79c88256bcd007d7cbc?OpenDocument (last visited Oct.
25, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release].
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II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. Point Source vs. Nonpoint Source Pollution
Congress enacted the CWA in an attempt to remedy the de-
ficiencies of earlier legislation.6 Unlike previous congressional
action, the CWA targeted "the preventable causes of pollution,"7
and in so doing, the Act divided pollution into two categories:
point source and nonpoint source.8
The CWA defines point source pollution as "any discerni-
ble, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." 9 Nonpoint source pollution, while not defined in the
CWA itself, has been determined to include polluted runoff com-
ing from "diffuse or scattered sources in the environment rather
than from a defined outlet such as a pipe."' The sources of this
polluted runoff include, among other things:
excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides
from agricultural lands and residential areas; oil,
grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff
and energy production; sediment from improp-
erly managed construction sites, crop and forest
lands, and eroding streambanks; salt from irriga-
tion practices; acid drainage from abandoned
mines; and bacteria and nutrients from live-
stock, pet wastes, and faulty septic systems."
The CWA controls point source pollution through directly
mandated technological controls.' 2 However, no such control over
nonpoint source pollution exists.' 3 Rather, nonpoint source pollu-
tion is constrained by "the 'threat and promise' of federal grants to
'Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9" Cir. 2002).
71d. (quoting EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bo., 426 U.S. 200, 202-03
(1976)).
,Pronsolino, 219 F.3d at 1126.
'33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
'°Environmental Protection Agency, What is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, at
http://www.epa.gov/region4/water/nps/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
1/d.




states to accomplish th[e] task" 14 of "recogniz[ing], preserv[ing],
and protect[ing] the primary responsibilities and rights of States to
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the devel-
opment and use... of land and water resources."
' 15
B. Section 303 - Provisions for Water Quality Standards and
TMDLs
Section 303 of the CWA requires states to establish water
quality standards for all waters within their boundaries. If a state
fails to do so or if the EPA determines a state has not sufficiently
complied with these requirements, the EPA will establish appro-
priate water quality standards for that state.1 6 Section 303(d) spe-
cifically requires states to identify waterways with insufficient
controls and to establish the total maximum daily load for pollut-
ants upon those waters.'
7
CWA § 303(d) provides the method of identifying water-
ways with insufficient controls as follows:
Each State shall identify those waters within its
boundaries for which the effluent limitations re-
quired by ... this title are not stringent enough to
implement any water quality standard applicable to
such waters. The State shall establish a priority
ranking for such waters, taking into account the se-
verity of the pollution and the uses to be made of
such waters.' 8
After such identification, a state must establish TMDLs for
those waterways.' 9 "A TMDL defines the specified maximum
amount of a pollutant which can be discharged or 'loaded' into the
41d. at 1126-27 (quoting Or. Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092,
1096 (9th Cir. 1998)).
'
5
Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1126-27 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)).
'6 1d. at 1127; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2) ("[W]ater quality standard shall con-
sist of the designated uses of the navigable waters involved and the water quality criteria for
such waters based upon such uses. Such standards shall be such as to protect the public health
or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this chapter. Such standards
shall be established taking into consideration their use and value for public water supplies,
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
purposes, and also taking into consideration their use and value for navigation." Id.)
1733 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994).
"33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(l)(A) (1994).
'"33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
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waters at issue from all combined sources,"20 and must be "estab-
lished at a level necessary to implement the applicable water qual-
ity standards.",
21
Upon completion of the above steps, states must submit
their priority list and their TMDLs to the EPA for review.22 If the
EPA is not satisfied with the states' findings, it will establish its
own priority list and TMDLs for the state.23 Implementation of
the TMDLs is then relegated to the states through their continued
24planning processes.
III. CASE HISTORY
In 1960, Betty and Guido Pronsolino acquired approxi-
mately 800 acres of heavily logged timber land in the Garcia River
watershed in Mendocino County, California. 25 In 1998, after the
forest had significantly re-grown, the Pronsolinos applied for a
permit with the California Department of Forestry to begin re-
harvesting on the timber land. 26 The department granted the appli-
cation for the permit, but it contained numerous restrictions upon
the land's use. 27  The cost of the Pronsolino's compliance with
these considerable restrictions was estimated at $750,000.21 In
addition to the Pronsolinos, Larry Mailliard and Bill Barr were
property owners who had applied for harvesting permits within the
Garcia River watershed, and compliance with their individual re-
strictions was estimated to cost $10,602,000 and $962,000, respec-
tively.29
The TMDL restrictions placed upon the waterway resulted
in abundant limitations upon the harvesting permits of property
owners within the Garcia River watershed. 30  The Garcia River
was omitted from the requisite CWA priority list California sub-
2 Pronsolino, 291 F.3d 1123, 1128 (quoting Dioxin/Organiochlorine Ctr v. Clarke,
57 F.3d 1517, 1520 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Or. Natural Desert Assoc. v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d
1092, 1097 (stating that the term "discharge" refers only to pollution from point sources.); see
also 40 C.F.R. § 130.2(c) (2000) (stating that the term "loading" refers to pollution of a body of
water from either point source or nonpoint sources).
"133 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (1994).
2233 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1994).
231d.24
1d.
25Pronsolino, 291 F3d at 1129.







mitted to the EPA and the list was accordingly disapproved. 31 By
way of remedy, the EPA established the new priority list for Cali-
fornia, including within it the Garcia River and sixteen other wa-
terways polluted solely by nonpoint sources.32 Nevertheless, Cali-
fornia remained defiant and did not establish TMDLs for the Gar-
cia River and the other waterways added by the EPA until a con-
sent decree required such action.33 Thereafter, the EPA estab-
lished the Garcia River TMDL for sediment at 552 tons per square
mile per year, allocated among: "a) 'mass wasting' associated
with roads; b) 'mass wasting' associated with timber-harvesting;
c) erosion related to road surfaces; and d) erosion related to road
and skid trail crossings.
3 4
On August 12, 1999, the Pronsolinos, the Mendocino
County Farm Bureau, the California Farm Bureau Federation and
the American Farm Bureau Federation brought suit against the
EPA and its administrators, "challenging the EPA's authority to
impose TMDLs on rivers polluted only by nonpoint sources of
pollution and sought a determination of whether the [Clean Water]
Act authorized the Garcia River TMDL."35 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California granted summary
judgment in favor of the EPA.36
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS
A. Holding
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that,
pursuant to the CWA, when a state fails to timely establish such
TMDLs, the EPA is properly authorized to include priority lists in
§ 303(d)(1) and to determine TMDLs for waterways polluted
solely by nonpoint sources of pollution.37 Furthermore, the court
resolved any ambiguity by granting substantial deference to the
EPA's reasonable interpretation.
B. Deference to the EPA




36Jd. (citing Pronsolino v. Marcus, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
37Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1140-41.
38ld. at 1141.
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The EPA contended in Pronsolino that it was entitled to
deference pursuant to Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council.39 According to Chevron, a court must "defer to an
agency's interpretation so long as it is reasonably consistent with
the statute," 40 and an agency is entitled to such deference if "Con-
gress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and ... the agency interpretation claim-
ing deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.' '41
The Pronsolinos contended the EPA was entitled to no deference
at all; they alleged that the EPA had inconsistently interpreted §
303(d) and that the current interpretation being asserted against
them had no force of law.42 In addition, the court noted that a
third option of deference existed pursuant to Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.43 In Skidmore, deference is at the midpoint of the spectrum,
permitting deference according to the persuasiveness of the
agency's position. 44
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately determined
that the EPA was entitled, at the very least, to deference pursuant
to Skidmore, and probably also under Chevron.45 It was uncon-
tested that the EPA possessed general rule-making authority pur-
suant to Congressional delegation; however, whether that author-
ity was properly exercised was in dispute.46  Nevertheless, the
court determined that EPA regulations regarding § 303(d)(1) lists
and TMDLs "focus on the attainment of water quality standards,
whatever the source of any pollution. 4 7 Because of these regula-
tions and various other factors, including delegated authority of
the EPA concerning the CWA and the agency's understanding of
the applicable regulations, the court felt that Chevron deference
was appropriate. Yet, the court found that the EPA had met the
lesser standard of deference set forth in Skidmore, making an ulti-
mate determination on the appropriate level of deference unimpor-
tant.49
391d. at 1131 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
'1d
41Id. (quoting United States v. Mead, 553 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001)).
42Pronsotino, 291 F.3d at 1131.
4'31d. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)).
"Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1123.
411d. at 1134-35.
"Id. at 1131.
47Id. at 1132-33; see also, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 130.2; 40 C.F.R. §130.3; 40 C.F.R. §
130.6; 40 C.F.R. § 130.7.




The court noted that the EPA had been consistent in requir-
ing that solely nonpoint source polluted waters be identified in the
state's § 303(d)(1)(A) list.5" While, admittedly, the EPA had been
lax on the enforcement of the inclusion of nonpoint source pollu-
tion within the priority list prior to the 1990s, the requirement was
nonetheless present, and the EPA's position was adequately sup-
ported."'
C. Language and Structure of the CWA
As previously noted, CWA § 303(d)(1)(A) requires priority
listing and TMDL calculation for "those waters within [the state's]
boundaries for which the effluent limitations required ... are not
stringent enough to implement any water quality standard appli-
cable to such waters."52  The Pronsolinos asserted the above-
quoted language could apply only to point source pollution be-
cause only point source pollution is subject to effluent limita-
tions.53 The EPA claimed the wording did not implicitly limit the
application to point source pollution covered by effluent limita-
tions, but rather the provision applied to all waters which could
not meet any water quality standard.54
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the interpreta-
tion of which water quality standards are stringent enough should
concentrate on the broad goal the CWA sought to attain.55 Based
upon the overreaching goal of the CWA, the Pronsolino Court
determined, "[The] ... sensible conclusion is that the § 303(d)(1)
list must contain any waters for which the particular effluent limi-
tations will not be adequate to attain the statute's water quality4
goals," thereby including nonpoint source polluted waterways.
By analyzing the manner in which the priority list was to have
been compiled, the court further supported its holding.
5 7
Pursuant to § 303(d), a state must initially identify all
navigable waters within its boundaries.58 Subsequently, any of the




"Id. at 1135 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1994)) (emphasis added).




"Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1994).
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after application of point source technology are removed.59 All
waters remaining on the list, including nonpoint sources which
obviously will not be removed in the above process, will have
TMDLs established. 60 This construction evidences Congress' in-
tent "that the EPA focus initially on implementing effluent limita-
tions and only later avert its attention to water quality stan-
dards."
61
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' previous hold-
ing in Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke62 supported this inter-
pretation and holding. The court, when discussing Clarke, stated:
the EPA acted within its statutory authority in
setting TMDLs for toxic pollutants, even though
the effluent limitations referenced by §
303(d)(1)(A) did not apply to those pollutants.
The court explained that, since best practical
technology effluent limitations did not apply to
toxic pollutants, those limitations are, as a mat-
ter of law, 'not stringent enough' to achieve wa-
ter quality standards.63
Accordingly, "not stringent enough" was held to be equiva-
lent to "not adequate for" and "inapplicable to." 64  Per that
construction, the mere fact that effluent limitations cannot be
applied to nonpoint sources does not bar the required calculation
of TMDLs because the statute would read as TMDLs must be
established for "those waters ... for which the effluent limitations
required ... are [inapplicable to] ... such waters. 65
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the premise that the CWA, as a whole, distinguishes between point
and nonpoint sources.66 While noting that in many areas the CWA
does distinguish between the two types of pollution, the court de-
termined the Act by no means does so in all instances. 67 One in-
5
9Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1136; 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(A) (1994).
ePronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1136.
"Id. at 1136
6257 F.3d 1517 (9th Cir. 1995).
Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1137; see also Dioxin/Organochlorine Center v. Clarke, 57
F.3d 1517 at 1528.
' Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1137.





stance in which the two sources are treated identically is when the
§ 303(d) list and TMDLs are compiled because "[w]ater quality
standards reflect a state's designated uses for a water body and do
not depend in any way upon the source of pollution."68 CWA §
303(d) is "structurally part of a set of provisions governing an
interrelated goal-setting, information-gathering, and planning
process that, unlike many other aspects of the CWA, applies with-
out regard to the source of pollution. 69
D. Federalism Issues
Finally, by establishing TMDLs for nonpoint source pol-
luted waters, the Ninth Circuit held the EPA had not infringed
upon states' traditional control over land use.70 The TMDLs es-
tablished by the EPA do not specify the "load" from individual
pieces of land nor do they dictate what measures the states must
use in order to implement the TMDLs; rather, such issues are left
to the respective states to determine.7' Moreover, states are only
required to implement TMDLs to the extent they are willing to
forego federal grant monies because no other statutory provision
provides for the implementation or enforcement of § 303 plans.
72
V. IMPACT OF PRONSOLJNO V. NASTRI
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Pronsolino
v. Nastri "affirms [EPA] efforts to continue using a strong tool to
help restore America's rivers and clean up pollution regardless of
its source." 73 Not surprisingly, "[n]onpoint source pollution is the
dominant water quality problem in the United States today. 74 In
fact, only one percent of California's waterways fail to meet water
quality standards solely due to point source pollution; fifty-four
percent of the state's polluted waters are due to solely nonpoint
source pollution, and the remaining forty-five percent are a com-
bination of the two.75 This is certainly representative of the na-
tion's waterways as a whole given the stringent technological
6id.at 1137; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(c) (1994).
'Pronsolino, 291 F.3d at 1138.
"Id. at 1140.
71id.
7'1d.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
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standards placed upon point sources. 76 While such dire conditions
unquestioningly call for quick action by regulators and enforcers,
the Ninth Circuit's ruling raises significant issues for states and
individuals on their use of lands surrounding impaired waterways.
Given the wide range of activities that may contribute to
polluted run-off into streams and waterways, universal application
of the Pronsolino decision could have a tremendous impact upon
agricultural activities, construction sites, mining and timber opera-
tions and even on homeowners. As noted previously, nonpoint
source pollution arises from a multitude of everyday activities -
i.e., fertilizer in flowerbeds, insecticide on crops, failing septic
systems, animal waste and urban waste runoff. Under the Pron-
solino decision, a homeowner who uses fertilizer on his lawn that
runs into a polluted waterway could be faced with significant
monetary outlay in order to continue upkeep of a well-manicured
lawn.77 A small, local farmer may be unable to continue grazing
cattle or cultivating fruits and vegetables because of the significant
restrictions placed upon such activity and the resulting substantial
costs imposed upon him. 78 After all, the Pronsolino's were faced
with a $750,000 bill in order to maintain the same activity that
they had engaged in prior to the TMDL restrictions applied to their
neighboring waterway. 79
However, it must be recognized further that under the
CWA scheme and pursuant to the holding in Pronsolino, states
must determine how to achieve the TMDLs. Failure to require
such reductions in polluted run-off will only result in a loss of
federal funding to the states.80 Accordingly, any impact of the
76See Environmental Protection Agency, Nonpoint Source Pollution: The Nation's
Largest Water Quality Problem, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/pointl .htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2002). "Today, nonpoint source (NPS) pollution remains the Nation's largest source of
water quality problems. It's the main reason that approximately forty percent of our surveyed
rivers, lakes, and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as fishing or swim-
ming." Id.
77See Environmental Protection Agency, Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution from
Households, at http://www.epa.gov/owowlnpslfacts/pointlO.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
"Although the individual homes might contribute only minor amounts of NPS [nonpoint
source] pollution, the combined effect of an entire neighborhood can be serious. These include
eutrophication, sedimentation, and contamination with unwanted pollutants." Id.
7 See Environmental Protection Agency, Managing Nonpoint Source Pollution from
Agriculture, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/facts/point6.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2002).
Such agriculture activities as confined animal facilities, grazing, pesticide spraying, irrigation,
and fertilizing are the leading sources of nonpoint source pollution to rivers and lakes, the third
largest sources to estuaries, and a major contributor to groundwater contamination and wetlands
degredation. See id.
"Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1129-30 (9 " Cir. 2002).
"See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2) (1994); 33 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1994); 33 U.S.C. §
1329(h); see also id. at 1128-29.
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Pronsolino decision will be left to the individual states for imple-
mentation.8' Given the state implementation, it is unlikely that
any action will be taken against homeowners who fertilize their
lawns or against someone with a faulty septic system. On the
other hand, state implementation does little to allay the fears of
construction companies, mining and timber operations, farmers
and other such entities that contribute to nonpoint source pollu-
tion. Legislatures will be much more willing and likely to focus on
business sources than on the everyday voter. Yet, the full reach of
Pronsolino remains to be seen.
VI. CONCLUSION
Pronsolino v. Nastri is a landmark decision recognizing the
CWA authorizes the EPA to establish TMDLs for waterways pol-
luted solely by nonpoint sources of pollution. In doing so, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals made a remarkable impact upon the future
attainment of the CWA's primary goal to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters,
82
regardless of the source from which the pollution derives. However,
the entire effect of the decision rendered in Pronsolino remains un-
clear, as the battle for clean and safe waters rages within the individ-
ual state legislatures.
'See Debbie Shosteck, Pronsohino v. Marcus, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 327 (2001).
"[W]hile EPA's new TMDL regulations tighten the implementation requirements, issues of state
sovereignty preclude EPA from requiring states to carry out the mandates of a federal statute.
Under the Supreme Court's prevailing Tenth Amendment analysis, the federal government
cannot enlist states to administer federal laws. As a result, unless a state enforces TMDLs for
its waterways by imposing mandatory BMPs [best management practices], nonpoint source
polluters will be allowed to dodge responsibility for meeting water quality standards." Id. at
353-54.
8233 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).
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